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Abstract 
 
In this paper we examine several dimensions of gender disparity for a sample of 40 
countries using micro-level data. We start by documenting the reversal of the gender 
education gap and ranking countries by the year in which it reversed.  Then we turn to an 
analysis of the state of other gaps facing women: we compare men and women’s labor 
force participation (the labor force participation gap), married and single women’s labor 
force participation (the marriage gap), and mothers’ and non-mother’s labor force 
participation (the motherhood gap).  We show that gaps still exist in these spheres in many 
countries, though there is significant heterogeneity among countries in terms of the size of 
and the speed at which these gaps are changing. We also show the relationship between 
the gaps and ask how much the participation gap would be reduced if the gaps in other 
spheres were eliminated. In general, we show that while there seems to be a relationship 
between the decline of the education gap and the reduction of the other gaps, the link is 
rather weak and highly heterogeneous across countries.  
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I. Introduction 
   
Eliminating differences in education between men and women has been a priority of 
development organizations and the international community for many years.  The Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) to “eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, 
preferably by 2005, and in all levels of education no later than 2015” is pursued by institutions 
like the United Nations and the World Bank. According to the World Bank, “there is no 
investment more effective for achieving development goals than educating girls.”  Equality of 
educational opportunities between men and women  was  also been acknowledged in the 
Universal Declaration of Human rights of 1948.
1
After reversing the gender education gap, have these countries also made progress in 
closing other gender gaps?  What have we observed regarding gender equality and women’s 
empowerment in terms of participation -  married women versus single women  and  mothers and 
non-mothers’ participation?  How have developed countries fared relative to developing 
countries?   
  It has been suggested [in the literature] that 
educating girls and achieving the MDG goal on gender equity will lead to a range of improved 
outcomes for developing countries (see e.g. Schultz, 2002), including higher economic growth 
(e.g. Abu-Ghaida and Klasen, 2004).  In many countries, the differences in education between 
men and women has disappeared, or even reversed.  This reversal of the gender education gap 
has occurred in almost all developed countries and many developing countries as well, even 
among cohorts born over 60 years ago in several countries.   
In this article, we use International Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS-
International) Census data from 40 countries to document the reversal of the gap and to rank 
countries by the year in which the gender education gap reversed.  We then turn to an analysis of 3 
 
the state of other gaps facing women comparing the participation gap, the marriage gap, and the 
motherhood gap.  We show that gaps still exist in these spheres in many countries, although there 
is significant heterogeneity in terms of the size of the gaps and the speed at which they are 
changing. Finally, we investigate the relationship between the gaps. 
 
II. Motivation  
Evidence has shown that educating women can lead to improved economic and social 
outcomes. Specifically, recent empirical work, which has primarily  focused on developing 
countries, shows that there are both positive economic consequences and social externalities 
arising from improving women’s education.  For example, increases in women’s education have 
been associated with  reductions in fertility (e.g.  Osili  and  Long, 2008), decreases in infant 
mortality and increases in life expectancy (see Dancer et al., 2008; Behrman and Deolalikar, 
1988).  Overall, it appears that educating women has beneficial effects on children’s health (see 
Glewwe, 2000), schooling, and adult productivity (Lam and Duryea, 1999; Strauss and Thomas 
1995).  It holds a larger beneficial effect than the same level of father’s education (see Schultz 
2002).  In addition, studies have shown that the benefits from expanding female education are far 
greater than the benefits from other public interventions, such as improving family planning 
service provision or increasing the number of physicians in the population (Kingdon, 2002).  
Empirical evidence also shows that a low investment in women’s education leads to slower 
economic growth and reduced income levels (Dollar and Gatti, 1999; Klasen 1999).   
Why would we expect changes in other measures of gender disparity as a result of 
increases in women’s education? We next discuss the theoretical reasoning behind the potential 4 
 
effect of narrowing the education gap on women’s participation by married and unmarried 
women and by those with and without children.  
 
a. Labor Force Participation and Earnings  
The theory of human capital investment relates differences in earnings to differences in 
schooling, training,  and other assets (Mincer,  1974;  Becker,  1991).  Specifically, it relates 
expected lifetime labor force participation to one’s incentive to acquire education and training. 
According to this theory, education increases the productivity, and thus, the earnings of 
individuals. Existing studies have established a strong, causal relationship between education and 
income at the individual level.
2
As Becker (1992) suggests, human capital theory explains why women have traditionally 
had fewer incentives to invest in education and training given their shorter expected labor force 
participation.  Many factors have been put forward to explain why this has changed over time 
and why the gender gap in education has closed and even reversed in many countries.  In the 
case of the United States., the technological change that led to the use of mechanical rather than 
human energy (Galor and Weil 2000), the rapid expansion of the service sector (Becker, 1992); 
as well as changes in household work through the use of piped water, electricity, and appliances 
(Killingsworth and Heckman, 1986; Greenwood et al., 2005; Goldin 2006); greater ability to 
control pregnancies through access to birth-control technology, and lower effort costs of college 
preparation and attendance for girls than for boys, (Goldin and Katz, 2006). Also, the increase in 
divorce rates and decline in family size, have been suggested as correlates and possible 
determinants of the reversal of the gender gap in education.  
   5 
 
The increases in education have allowed women to increase their expected lifetime labor-
force participation, shifting their time horizon. Consequently, their expected benefits from an 
increased investment in education, leading them to plan “careers” instead of having “jobs” and 
being the “secondary worker” within the household (Goldin 2006).  In this regard, research 
shows that returns on women’s education in many countries are either equal or higher than those 
for men.  Consequently, the opportunity cost of staying home increases as women’s level of 
education increases.  
 
b. Marriage and Labor Force Participation 
Married women’s labor force participation has been the subject of much debate in the 
literature. Mincer’s (1962) model was the first that tried to explain the apparent puzzle of the 
increase in married women’s labor force participation in spite of steady increases in men’s real 
earnings in the United States.  He found the positive substitution effect of general wage increases 
on women’s employment to be greater than the negative income effect through the husband’s 
wage, with the difference being large enough for increases in women’s wages to explain much of 
the increase in married women’s labor force participation.  
Goldin  (1990) shows how changes in income and wage elasticities can affect the 
evolution of women’s labor force participation, while Blau and Kahn (2007) examine trends in 
married women’s own- and cross-wage elasticities.  They find that in the United States from 
1980-2000, married women’s own-wage elasticity fell by about one-half and their 
responsiveness to husbands’ wages declined by about 40 percent.   Heim (2007) also examines 
U.S.’ married women’s labor supply elasticities over 1979-2002 finding that married women’s 6 
 
wage and income elasticities for both participation and hours decreased dramatically in absolute 
value over the period.    
Juhn and Murphy (1997) focus on women’s employment and earnings and examine it at 
different points of the husbands’ wage distribution from 1959 to 1989 and find an increasingly 
weaker relationship between women’s labor force participation and their husbands’ earnings.  
They also confirm a positive relationship between women’s wages and labor force participation, 
casting doubts on the increase in married women’s labor force participation to compensate the 
low earnings growth of their husbands.  In addition to economic factors, Fernandez (2007) shows 
how changes in culture and social norms as part of a rational intergenerational learning process 
may have affected the increase in married women’s participation in the workforce. 
 
c. Fertility and Labor force Participation    
In the neoclassical model of the family, women tended to specialize in domestic 
production, including child rearing and traditional household activities whereas men were the 
primary earners and specialized in formal production through labor market activities (Mincer, 
1962; Becker 1991).  Moreover, even for women in the labor force, rearing children in the early 
years was associated with a decrease in working experience and wages.  Subsequent models 
found the neoclassical model to be inadequate in explaining the rise in married women’s 
employment (e.g., Bowen and Finegan, 1969; Smith and Ward, 1985) and focused on other 
factors to explain the evolution of mothers’ labor force participation. 
First, the expansion of education appears to be related to a decline in fertility rates 
(Caldwell, 1980; Galor and Weil, 1996 and 1999) and to a delay in the start of fertility (see 
Strauss and Thomas (1995) for a review of the existing literature).  According to Caldwell 7 
 
(1982), education influences fertility by increasing the cost of children and the importance of 
investing in children’s human capital, leading women’s optimal fertility choices toward higher 
quality (Becker and Lewis, 1973; Willis 1973).  Becker et al. (1990) show how higher levels of 
human capital lead to an increase in the returns on human capital, as well as to fewer children.  
Galor and Weil (1996) relate increases in women’s wages to the decline in fertility, which, in 
their theoretical framework, is a consequence of the increase in the cost of children more than the 
increase in household income. Several studies in the recent literature have tried to establish a 
causal relationship between education and fertility in order to address issues of reverse causality 
and possible omitted variables  (e.g. Breierova and Duflo, 2004;  McCrary and Royer,  2008; 
Duflo, Kremer and Dupas, 2010). 
Second, advances in household production technology have reduced the time necessary 
for domestic production.  In addition, advances in medical technology have reduced the time 
associated with childbirth and rearing (Barker and Feiner, 2004), allowing women to return to 
the labor force faster. Third, the shift of economic activity toward the service sector and the 
consequent introduction of scheduled part-time employment, which is more “female friendly”, as 
well as the increase in returns to education, has led to an expansion of married women and 
mothers’ labor  force participation (Goldin,  2006;  Goldin et al.,  2006),  increasing educated 
women’s opportunity cost of staying out of the labor force (Attanasio et al., 2009).   
Based on this literature, we would expect that an increase in women’s levels of education 
would lead to an increase in women’s labor force participation
34, higher labor force participation 
among mothers, lower fertility rates and smaller wage gaps.  That is, we would expect that 
empowering women with more education would increase their economic participation and give 
them a greater access to economic resources, leading to an improvement in many other spheres. 8 
 
A large cross-country analysis of the reversal of the gender education gap and the gender gaps in 
these other areas is lacking.  We provide evidence on the dynamics of the gender gaps in these 
areas in the remainder of the paper.   We also relate the state of the gender gaps to policy-
relevant factors such as levels of GDP, urbanization, and labor market rigidity.   
 
IV.   Data  
Our analysis is based on a country-year-level dataset constructed using micro-level data 
for each country.  The primary source used to construct the dataset is the IPUMS-International 
(Minnesota Population Center, 2009), which includes the largest publicly available individual-
level census data and consists of decennial records of persons and households. We draw upon 
data for select countries from Africa, Asia, Europe, and Latin America as available, drawing 
upon the most recent wave of the Census for each country. In most cases the difference between 
the two waves of the census is ten years.  The focus of our analysis is one cohort of women and 
men – those individuals aged 35-44. The motivation for including this age group is to include 
individuals who have finished their studies and have made the bulk of their marriage, fertility 
and labor market decisions..  Appendix Table A lists the years and countries for the analytical 
samples based on the Census data. 
Using the Census data for each country, we measure several gender gaps.  First, we 
define the “education gap” as the difference in average years of education between men and 
women.  The “labor force participation gap” is the share of men who are in the labor force 
(employed or unemployed and job-seeking) minus the share of women who are in the labor 
force
5.  The “marriage gap” is the difference in rates of employment among women who are 9 
 
married (or living in cohabitation) and single women.  The “motherhood gap” is the difference in 
rates of employment among women with three or more children and women without children. 
We supplement the measures constructed from the IPUMS Census data with country-
level variables from the World Development indicators, including measures of GDP per capita 
and urbanization rates.   We also include measures of labor market rigidity extracted from the 
World Bank’s Doing Business dataset.  
 
V. The Education Gap 
First, we document the reversal of the gender education gap.  Figure 1a shows the year of 
birth of the first cohort where the education gap was closed in the most recent available wave of 
the census. This corresponds to a wave in the early 2000s in most countries.
6
Except for Austria, countries where the gender gap has not closed are developing 
countries. On the other hand, we observe that in most developed countries and also in some 
developing countries, the gap not only has closed but has significantly reversed (Hausmann et 
 Among the 40 
countries included in our sample, 27 have closed the gap, while in the remaining 13 countries, 
men still have higher levels of schooling than women on average. The first country where the 
gap was closed is Belarus, for the cohort born in 1945, the last are South Africa and Romania for 
the cohort born in 1975.  In the United States, the gap was closed for cohorts born in 1956. 
Interestingly, in 10 developing countries, the gender gap in years of schooling was closed earlier 
than in the United States.  The timing of the closure of the gender gap in education implies that 
in countries where the gap was closed in the 1950s, two generations already have experienced 
gender equality in years of schooling, while in the countries where the education gap was closed 
in the 1970s, only one generation is experiencing this phenomenon.  10 
 
al., 2009).  Table B shows that the gap in years of schooling at age 25 is still very large in 
Bolivia, Iraq, China, Palestine, Kenya,  and Rwanda, with gaps ranging between 1.2 and 0.6 
years of schooling; gaps are much smaller in Austria and Mexico, both with 0.1 years.  The gap 
has closed in Vietnam, and it has reversed significantly in Mongolia, Venezuela, Argentina, 
Brazil, and Greece where 25 year-old women have between 0.8 and 1.2 years of schooling more 
than men. Among Latin American countries, the gap has closed and reversed in most of them (8 
out of 10).  Only Mexico and Bolivia exhibit the existence of a gap, still significant in the case of 
Bolivia. 
Figure 1b shows women’s average level of education and relates this to the current level 
of the gender gap.  We observe that in most developed countries, the gap is either equal to zero 
(gender equality) or has reversed. Interestingly, among those countries where the gender gap has 
reversed, most are ones where women do not have the highest average levels of education (e.g., 
Argentina and Brazil vs. Canada and the United States).  In countries like Rwanda and Guinea, 
where women have the lowest average levels of education, the gender gap is between 1.35 and 
1.86 years of schooling.  In countries where the gender gap is the highest (i.e., Uganda, Kenya 
and India), women’s average level of education is close to four years.  Moreover, even in Bolivia 
and Mexico, the gender gap has reversed in urban areas but still exists among the indigenous 
population and in rural areas (Duryea et al., 2007). 
Next we examine the dynamics of the gender education gap.  Figure 1c shows the gender 
gap in years of schooling for the age group 35-44 in the older wave of the census against the 
change in the gender education gap for the same age group., where the change is calculated 
between the most recent wave of the census and the previous one. We can observe that in the 
majority of countries, the gap is falling. The exception is India, where the gap is rising. As the 11 
 
second most populated country in the world, the rising gender gap in India warrants further 
analysis.. If we look at the change over time, we can observe the reduction in the gender gap 
over the course of a decade has ranged from close to 0 to -0.60 years.
7
 
  Only Mongolia 
experienced a decrease in the gap greater than a year at -1.34 years, which we excluded from the 
graph.  
VI.   The Labor Force Participation Gap 
Subsequently, we examine labor  force participation, where the gap is defined as the 
difference between the shares of men in the labor force with that of women.  Figure 2a shows the 
gap in labor force participation in the most recent wave of the census. Rwanda is the only 
country where women’s labor force participation is higher than men’s. It is important to notice 
that this cohort has been affected by the 1994 genocide, which has likely affected gender roles in 
the household and women’s labor force participation. Other African states have women’s labor 
force participation rates as high as those available in our sample of developed countries (Ghana, 
Kenya, and South Africa). Belarus exhibits equal labor force participation between men and 
women. Also, the other former or current communist countries (Cambodia, Romania, Mongolia, 
Hungary, China,  and Vietnam) exhibit high female labor force  participation rates and 
participation gaps below 20 percent. Latin American countries have higher participation gaps 
ranging between 29 percent in Argentina and 53 percent in Costa Rica. On the other hand, the 
Arab countries - Jordan, Iraq and Palestine - exhibit very large gaps above 60 percent. Among 
developed countries, Southern European countries (Greece, Spain and Portugal) have lower 
levels of women’s labor  force participation relative to men with respect to their Western 
counterparts.     12 
 
Then we examine the change in the labor-force participation gap with respect to the 
previous wave of the census. In Figure 2b, we plot the initial gap (horizontal axis) against the 
change in the gap (vertical axis). We observe heterogeneity in the change in the gap among 
countries that had high initial participation gaps.  Brazil and Spain, which had large gaps in the 
1990s, also had a reduction in the gap greater than 20 percentage points, which is the greatest 
among the countries in the sample. On the other hand, among countries with participation gaps 
above 30 percent in the initial period, Argentina, Venezuela, Israel, and Greece experienced a 
reduction in the gap between 10 and 20 percentage points, whereas Panama, Malaysia, India, 
Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, and Colombia had a more limited reduction in the gap, below 10 
percentage points. On the other hand, Mexico experienced a widening of the participation gap.  
Rwanda, which already exhibited no participation gap in the early 1990s, had a further reduction 
in the gap.  In Vietnam, Romania, South Africa, and the United States, the gap is rising, while it 
falls by less than 10 percentage points in the remaining countries. 
Figure 2c shows that GDP and women’s labor force participation follow a U-shaped 
curve, with women’s labor force participation high (above 70 percent) in countries like Rwanda, 
Guinea, Ghana, and Cambodia with levels of annual GDP per capita below $1,500. Women’s 
labor force participation rates are also high in countries like Austria, France, the United States, 
and Canada with GDP per capita above $22,000. We also observe that most middle-income 
countries exhibit women’s labor force participation rates below 60 percent. The level of GDP per 
capita at which women’s labor force participation is at a minimum
8 is approximately $2,800; 
Iraq’s GDP per capita is close to $2,747 in this period and women’s labor force participation is 
the lowest among the countries in our sample at close to 14 percent. 13 
 
Similarly, if we plot GDP per capita against the labor force participation gap (Figure 2d) 
we observe that the gap is lower at lower and higher levels of GDP per capita. This dynamic 
tends to be related to  urbanization. In rural settings, women tend to participate more in 
production, as much of it takes place in the family farm or nearby. Urbanization increases the 
cost of labor force participation. Unless expected incomes are high enough to overcome the 
significant costs of transportation in terms of time and fees, urbanization leads to a decline in 
female labor force participation.
9
We formalize this analysis with regressions showing the relationship between GDP and 
the labor force participation gap.  We also examine the relationship between the labor force 
participation gap and the share of the population living in urban areas, as well as a measure of 
the rigidity of the labor market.  Table 2, Column 1, shows that the log of GDP per capita and the 
log of GDP per capita squared are significant predictors of the gap in labor force participation, 
confirming the relationship suggested by the previous graph.
  Nevertheless, we observe that in low-income countries with 
high female labor force participation rates (Ghana, Guinea, Rwanda, and Uganda) the gender gap 
in education still exists (Figure 1a).  On the other hand, in developed countries with equally high 
women’s labor force participation rates (Canada, France, and the United States) the gender gap 
in education has reversed and a greater share of women are employed in high skill urban 
occupations.   
10  Column 2 shows the regression 
results predicting the change in the LFP gap from the previous Census.  As the earlier graphical 
analysis showed, the level of the gap in the previous Census is negatively related to the change in 
the gap, so countries with higher initial levels of the gap have decreasing gaps, indicating 
convergence.  It also appears that the change in the LFP gap and the log of GDP per capita are 
positively related, also suggesting that there is a U-shaped relationship.  Surprisingly, the 14 
 
regressions also show that in countries with more rigid labor markets, the gap is decreasing 
more, suggesting that labor market policies may have an impact on the speed at which this gap is 
changing, but not with the sign that is often expected.
11  Finally, we see that the gap is 
decreasing more rapidly in countries with a greater share of the population living in urban 
areas.
12
 
  
VII.   The Marriage Gap 
Next, we examine the gap in employment rates between married women (or women 
living in cohabitation) and single women, or the marriage gap
13.   When we plot the marriage 
gap against the female employment rate in Figure 3a, we see that in countries where women’s 
employment is low (below 20 percent), the ratio of married to single women’s employment rate, 
is low.  This means that where fewer women work, fewer married women work relative to single 
women.  The Arab countries, Palestine, Iraq and Jordan, where the marriage gap is highest, fall 
into this category. As the female employment rate rises, the difference in employment between 
married and single women decreases.  There are several countries where female employment is 
high (above 60 percent), and married women work more than single women (Mongolia, Ghana, 
China, Slovenia, the UK, Hungary, Rwanda, Belarus, Canada, and Romania).  We can see that 
these countries include both developed and developing countries, communist and former 
communist countries.  Table 2, Column 3 shows regression results for the marriage gap.  The 
analysis confirms the relationship between overall female labor force  participation and the 
marriage gap.  The results also show that other variables that might play a role in the marriage 
gap – GDP, share urban, and the rigidity of the labor market – do not significantly explain the 
level of the marriage gap across countries. 15 
 
 
In Figure 3b we present the dynamics of the marriage gap by plotting the initial marriage 
gap on the horizontal axis and the decade change in the gap on the vertical axis.  We see that 
countries that started with small gaps had small changes in the marriage gap.  But the picture is 
less clear for countries that started with large initial marriage gaps.  Some countries with large 
initial gaps like Argentina, Brazil, and Spain had large reductions in the gap.  Other countries 
with large initial gaps, like Chile, Ecuador, Venezuela, India, Colombia, and Panama had small 
reductions in the gap.  Other like Costa Rica, Malaysia, and Mexico meanwhile had increases in 
the marriage gap. 
 
VIII.   The Motherhood Gap 
Now we turn to the gap in employment among women with three children and women 
without children, or the motherhood gap.  When we look at the ranking of countries by the 
motherhood gap in Figure 4a, we see that for most countries in our sample, women with children 
tend to work less than women without children (negative values for the motherhood gap).  The 
gap is largest in Chile, followed by Costa Rica and Argentina.  On the other hand, there are 
several countries with a positive motherhood gap, meaning that women with children work more 
than women without children.  In Rwanda the difference is almost 10 percent.  Interestingly, the 
countries with the lowest female employment rates, Iraq and Palestine, have positive motherhood 
gaps. n Table 2, Column 4, we show the regression results for the motherhood gap, which shows 
that there is no significant relationship between the motherhood gap and GDP, urbanization, the 
rigidity of the labor market, and the overall labor force participation of women. 
 16 
 
In Figure 4b we show the change in the motherhood gap across census waves vs. the 
initial gap.  We see that countries with larger initial motherhood gaps had large changes in the 
gap, like in Austria, Brazil and Greece.  Meanwhile, countries with positive motherhood gaps in 
the previous census, like China, Vietnam and South Africa, had very small changes. 
 
IX. The Relationship between the Gaps 
In this section, we examine the relationships between the gaps we have discussed thus far 
- the gender gaps in education and labor force participation, and the marriage and motherhood 
gaps.  In Figure 5a we plot the gender gap in education on the horizontal axis and the gender gap 
in labor force participation on the vertical axis.  While we do not see a clear relationship between 
these gaps, it is evident that while the gender education gap has reversed in many countries, a 
labor force participation gap is still present.  For example, countries like Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, the Philippines, Panama, and Venezuela, have all reversed the gender education gap, 
but have labor force participation gaps between 40 and 70 percent.  Meanwhile, countries like 
China, Vietnam, and Kenya have large gender education gaps, but low labor force participation 
gaps.  Rwanda, where women work more than men, has not reversed the gender education gap 
either.  As discussed earlier, these patterns may be explained by greater labor force participation 
among low-skilled women in these countries.  A country-level regression in Table 3, Column 1 
shows that after controlling for other factors, the education gap in the cohort is not significantly 
related to the LFP gap. 
In figure 5b we can observe the relationship between the change in the education and 
labor force participation gaps. We can observe that in no country has had both gaps increase. In 
India, the gender gap in education has increased by 9 percent while the gender gap in labor force 17 
 
participation has decreased by around 4 percent. On the other hand, in countries like Romania, 
Vietnam, Mexico, South Africa, and the United States the gap in labor-force participation is 
increasing while the gap in education is either decreasing or remains unchanged. In the majority 
of countries both gaps have decreased between the oldest and newest waves of the census.  The 
most significant reduction in the labor force participation gap has occurred in Brazil and Spain, 
while the greatest decrease in the education gender gap has occurred in Kenya and Malaysia. 
There is heterogeneity in the remaining countries Panama and Uganda for example have 
experienced a reduction in the labor  force participation gap  less than 5 percent and in the 
education gap of less than 10 percent, while their Israeli and Greek counterparts experienced a 
reduction in these two gaps of close to 20 percent and 60 percent respectively.  Regression 
analysis (Table 3, Column 2) shows that we do not see a significant relationship between the 
change in the LFP gap and the change in the education gap.   
Turning to the motherhood gap and the marriage gap, we see in Table 3, Columns 4 and 
6, that the labor force participation gap is a significant predictor of both gaps, but the education 
gap is not.  Thus, the reduction in gender education gap has not, in general, triggered declines in 
the marriage and motherhood gaps.  These have responded instead to other factors that have 
affected the overall gap in men and women’s LFP. Apart from Iraq and Palestine, there appears 
to be a positive relationship between these gaps; the smaller the difference in employment among 
married and single women, the smaller the difference between employment among women with 
children and women without.  We imagine that many of the factors making marriage more 
compatible with work also tend to make motherhood more compatible with work.  Column 7 in 
Table 3 confirms the positive relationship between these gaps after controlling for other factors. 
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X. Reducing the Labor Force Participation Gap: Counterfactual Analysis 
Finally,  we ask how much of the gender gap in labor-force participation would be 
reduced by eliminating the education, marriage, and motherhood gaps.  We present a 
counterfactual analysis where we ask what the labor force participation of women would be if we 
gave women the average education of men, gave married women the labor force participation of 
otherwise equivalent single women, and gave mothers with three or more children the labor force 
participation of equivalent women without children (all else equal).  Then we show how much of 
the actual gap in labor  force participation between men and women is reduced given each 
counterfactual.   
For this analysis, we ran a regression for each country using the IPUMS Census data for 
women age 35 to 44.  We regressed labor force participation as a function of years of schooling, 
age, a dummy for being married, and dummies for having children (0-6+).  Then, given the 
estimated coefficients for women, we predicted what women’s labor force participation would be 
if (1) they had men’s level of education all other variables equal, (2) they were not married, (3) 
they had no children (for women with 3+ children.  Table 4 shows the results of the analysis.  
Column 1 shows the actual level of the gap.  In Column 2, we see how much women’s labor 
force participation would change if women had men’s average level of education for countries 
where the gender gap has not reversed. Giving women men’s level of education leads to 
reductions of the LFP gap of several percentage points in some African and Arab countries 
including  Guinea, Iraq, Kenya, Palestine, and Uganda. For other countries, the reduction is 
modest.  Note that India is a unique case, where the LFP gap increases, which arises due to a 
negative relationship between education and labor force participation.   
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Column 3 shows the change in the LFP gap if we eliminate the marriage gap.. For many 
countries, the reduction is large, particularly in Bolivia, Cambodia, Chile, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Malaysia, Panama, Spain, and Venezuela. In China, Ghana, Mongolia, and Slovenia, 
we note that LFP gap increases in the counterfactual scenario, so marriage in these countries is 
associated with greater labor force-participation among women. 
Next, we turn to the motherhood gap. We show in Column 4 what happens to the LFP 
gap when we give each mother with three or more children the LFP of an equivalent woman 
without children.  We see that for many countries with a motherhood gap, the cells are blank 
because the gap actually increases in this counterfactual.  In a few Latin American countries 
(Argentina and Chile), a couple of Arab countries (Iraq and Palestine), and Hungary, the LFP 
gap drops by a large amount when mothers are given the LFP of non-mothers.   
Finally, in the last column we show the residual, or the share of the actual LFP gap that is 
not explained by the counterfactuals based on eliminating the education, marriage, and 
motherhood gaps.  For most countries, a large share of the LFP gap remains unexplained after we 
eliminate these gaps.  For a few countries, notably Cambodia, Chile, Hungary, Kenya,  and 
Malaysia, less than half of the gap is left unexplained after eliminating the gaps in the other 
spheres, suggesting that in these countries, reducing the education, marriage, and motherhood 
gaps will go a significant way towards reducing the overall LFP gap.  However, consistent with 
our previous analysis at the country level, other factors besides the education, marriage, and 
motherhood gaps in LFP appear to explain the lion’s share of the overall gender gap in LFP for 
most countries. 
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XI. Conclusion and Discussion 
  The beneficial effects of educating girls and achieving gender equity in education have 
been prioritized by development organizations and the Millennium Development Goals.  In this 
analysis we have documented that in many countries, the gender education gap has now closed 
or even reversed.  However, all the countries in our samples where the gender gap has not closed 
are developing countries, apart from Austria.  Yet, while the education gap has closed or 
reversed in a majority of countries, other gaps regarding women’s employment, marriage, and 
motherhood remain. While many studies have been carried out at the national level, we have 
provided cross-country comparisons of these gaps.  We have also documented the dynamics of 
the gaps and examined the importance of variables like GDP, urbanization, and labor market 
rigidity. 
We document significant heterogeneity in terms of the size of gaps, the speed with which 
they are closing, and how they are inter-related.  It appears  that the closing of the gender 
education gap represents a “check in the mail” for future reductions in the gender gap in labor 
force participation, but does not appear to be significantly related to the gaps in employment 
between married and single women, and women with and without children.  The differences we 
observe among these countries in the size of the marriage and motherhood gaps are likely related 
to how compatible work is with marriage and children.  We show that for several countries, 
reductions in these gaps would reduce the overall gap in labor force participation significantly, 
but this would not be the case for many others. 
Much of development policy aimed at achieving the MDG on gender equity has focused 
on reducing gender gaps in schooling through policies that change education costs or benefits 
(see Glick, 2008).  We argue that attention should be broadened to include policies that make 21 
 
work more compatible with marriage and motherhood, which would likely increase the overall 
female employment and reduce the gender gap in female labor force  participation.  In fact, 
making these changes might encourage further educational investments by women. Regarding 
the motherhood gap, cultural attitudes, policies like availability of daycare or in-home help, 
urban transport, and other factors may play a role in whether women with children work, and 
more analysis into the impact of these factors on gender gaps is needed. Finally, it is clear that 
even after eliminating gaps associated with marriage and motherhood, female labor force 
participation seems to be low for other reasons that require further study.   
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Figure 1a: Year of Birth of First Cohort where Education Gap was closed  
 
Notes: The gender education gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is calculated as the 
average years of education of men minus women for individuals born in a given year.  The year of birth 
of the first cohort where the education gap was closed in the most recent available wave of the census is 
indicated for each country.  For countries where no year is indicated,  the gender gap in education has not 
reversed.   
 
Figure 1b:  Women’s Average Years of Schooling with respect to the Gender Education 
Gap, most recent census wave 
 
Notes: The gender education gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is defined as the average 
years of education of men minus women for individuals age 35-44. 
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Figure 1c: Change in the Gender Education Gap with respect to the Initial Gap  
 
Notes: The education gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is defined as the difference in 
years of schooling between men and women, aged 35-44; two outliers, Guinea and Mongolia have been 
excluded. 
 
Figure 2a: Labor Force Participation Gap   
 
Notes: The labor force participation gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is defined as the 
share of men in the labor force (employed or unemployed and job seeking) minus women in the labor 
force for individuals age 35-44. 
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Figure 2b: Change in the Gender Labor Force Participation Gap with respect to the Initial 
Gap  
 
 
Notes: The labor force participation gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is defined as the 
share of men in the labor force minus women in the labor force for individuals age 35-44. 
 
Figure 2c: Women’s Labor Force Participation vs. GDP per capita, PPP 
 
Note: GDP data comes from the World Development indicators.  Women’s labor force participation is 
calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  It is defined as the measure of the total number of women 
working or seeking work age 35-44 as a share of all women 35-44. 
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Figure 2d: Labor Force Participation Gap vs. GDP per capita, PPP 
 
Notes: GDP data comes from the World Development indicators.  The labor force participation gap is 
calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  The labor force participation gap calculated as the share of men 
in the labor force minus women in the labor force for individuals age 35-44. 
 
Figure 2e.  Labor Force Participation Gap vs. Share of Urban Population 
 
Notes: The share of the population living in urban areas data comes from the World Development 
indicators.  The labor force participation gap is calculated using the IPUMS Census data.  The labor force 
participation gap calculated as the share of men in the labor force minus women in the labor force for 
individuals age 35-44. 
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Figure 3a: Ratio of Married to Single Women Employment Rate 
  
Note: Measures constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The marriage gap is the difference in 
employment between single and married women aged 35-44. 
 
Figure 3b: Change in the Marriage Gap vs. Initial Gap 
 
Note: Measures constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The marriage gap is the difference in 
employment between single and married women aged 35-44. The change in the marriage gap is the 
percentage change in marriage gap between the last two censuses, for women aged 35–44. 
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 Figure 4a:  Motherhood Gap, most recent wave  
 
Notes: Measure constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The motherhood gap is the share of women 
with three children working minus the share of women with no children working for women aged 35-44. 
 
Figure 4b: Change in the Motherhood gap vs. the Initial Gap 
 
Notes: Measure constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The motherhood gap is the share of women 
with three children working minus the share of women with no children working for women aged 35-44. 
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Figure 5a: Gender Gap in Education vs. Gender Gap in Labor Force Participation 
 
Notes: Measure constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The gender education gap is the difference 
between men’s and women’s years of schooling for men and women aged 35-44.  The labor force 
participation gap is calculated as the share of men in the labor force divided by the share of women in the 
labor force for individuals age 35-44. 
 
Figure 5b: Change in Gender Gap in Education vs. Change in Gender Gap in Labor Force 
Participation 
 
Notes: Measure constructed from the IPUMS Census data.  The gender education gap is the difference 
between men’s and women’s years of schooling for men and women aged 35-44. The labor force 
participation gap calculated as the share of men in the labor force minus women in the labor force for 
individuals age 35-44. This graph is presented for those countries for which we have information on both 
the gender and the labor force participation gaps. 
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Figure 5c: Motherhood Gap vs. Marriage Gap 
 
Notes: Measure constructed from the IPUMS Census data. The motherhood gap is the share of women 
with three children working minus the share of women with no children working for women aged 35-44. 
The marriage gap is the difference in employment between single and married women aged 35-44. 
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Table 1. The Reversal of the Gender Education Gap 
Country 
Birth year of cohort in which 
gap reversed 
Gap in years of 
schooling at age 25 
Belarus  1945  -0.4 
Argentina  1946  -0.8 
Colombia  1949  -0.7 
Panama  1949  -0.6 
Brazil  1953  -0.8 
France  1953  -0.7 
Philippines  1953  -0.6 
Mongolia  1954  -1.2 
Venezuela  1955  -0.9 
Armenia  1955  -0.5 
Kyrgyz Rep  1955  -0.1 
Portugal  1956  -1.0 
United States  1956  0.0 
Israel  1958  -0.1 
Costa Rica  1960  -0.4 
Canada  1961  -0.5 
Hungary  1963  -0.3 
Greece  1964  -0.8 
Spain  1967  -0.7 
Slovenia  1970  -0.6 
Chile  1972  -0.1 
Malaysia  1973  -0.2 
Ecuador  1974  -0.3 
Jordan  1974  -0.2 
Vietnam  1974  0.0 
South Africa  1975  -0.4 
Romania  1975  -0.1 
Mexico    0.1 
Austria    0.1 
Rwanda    0.6 
Kenya    0.6 
Palestine    0.8 
China    0.8 
Iraq    1.1 
Bolivia    1.2 
Guinea    1.3 
India    1.5 
Cambodia  1.6 
Uganda    1.6 
Ghana    2.1 
Notes: The United Kingdom has been excluded as data is missing for the individuals age 25. 
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Table 2. Gender Gap Regressions 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
   LFP Gap 
Change in 
LFP Gap 
Marriage 
Gap 
Motherhood 
Gap 
Log GDP  1.146**  0.801***  -0.700  -0.228 
  (0.537)  (0.261)  (0.710)  (0.554) 
Log GDP-
Squared  -0.0685**  -0.0442***  0.0434  0.00805 
  (0.0305)  (0.0149)  (0.0412)  (0.0323) 
Rigidity of 
Employment 
Index  -0.000105  -0.00158**  -0.00153  0.000740 
  (0.00185)  (0.000705)  (0.00243)  (0.00191) 
Share Urban  0.287  -0.232**  -0.422  -0.0521 
  (0.217)  (0.0922)  (0.260)  (0.216) 
LFP Gap, 
Previous 
Census    -0.223**     
    (0.0794)     
Women’s 
LFP      0.919***  0.212 
      (0.0974)  (0.165) 
Constant  -4.613**  -3.365***  3.907  1.113 
  (2.260)  (1.088)  (2.948)  (2.329) 
Standard errors in parentheses     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
Notes: Regressions are based on the gender gap measures described in the data section.  GDP per capita 
and level of urbanization come from the World Development Indicators.  The Rigidity of Employment 
Index (0=less rigid, 100=more rigid) comes from the World Bank’s “Doing Business” dataset. This index 
measures the regulation of employment, specifically the hiring and firing of workers and the rigidity of 
working hours. It is the average of three indexes: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index, and 
a difficulty of firing index. The results do not change when including Share of Urban-Squared. 
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Table 3. Regressions Showing the Relationship Between Gaps  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
   LFP Gap 
Change in 
LFP Gap 
Marriage 
Gap 
Marriage 
Gap 
Motherhood 
Gap 
Motherhood 
Gap 
Motherhood 
Gap 
Log GDP  1.535***  0.386  -0.215  -0.0154  -0.198  -0.00976  -0.0421 
  (0.532)  (0.399)  (0.268)  (0.371)  (0.540)  (0.501)  (0.495) 
Log GDP-
Squared  -0.0894***  -0.0202  0.0125  0.00239  0.00617  -0.00310  -0.00175 
  (0.0303)  (0.0222)  (0.0156)  (0.0214)  (0.0314)  (0.0288)  (0.0285) 
Rigidity of 
Employment 
Index  -0.000632  -0.000482  0.000852  0.000935  0.00100  0.000307  -0.000126 
  (0.00174)  (0.000814)  (0.000929)  (0.00128)  (0.00187)  (0.00172)  (0.00172) 
Share Urban  0.287  -0.336***  0.00282  0.0205  -0.0309  0.0408  0.00642 
  (0.246)  (0.108)  (0.103)  (0.168)  (0.208)  (0.227)  (0.220) 
Education 
Gap   0.0739        0.0459     0.0539  0.0322 
  (0.0566)        (0.0441)     (0.0595)  (0.0593) 
Change in  
Education Gap  -0.0173           
    (0.0622)           
LFP Gap        -0.985***  -0.989***  -0.283  -0.500**    
        (0.0823)  (0.159)  (0.166)  (0.215)    
Marriage 
Gap                    0.444** 
                    (0.189) 
Constant  -6.422***  -1.668  1.955*  0.954  1.187  0.247  -0.0191 
  (2.238)  (1.707)  (1.112)  (1.576)  (2.242)  (2.124)  (2.149) 
Observations  27  22  28  19  28  19  19 
R-squared  0.425  0.505  0.907  0.865  0.518  0.751  0.753 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses,  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Regressions are based on the gender gap measures described in the data section. 
GDP per capita and level of urbanization come from the World Development Indicators.  The Rigidity of Employment Index (0=less rigid, 
100=more rigid) comes from the World Bank’s “Doing Business” dataset.  The results do not change when including Share of Urban-Squared.36 
 
Table 4. Counterfactual  Participation Gap Analysis 
Census Wave  (1) 
Actual LFP 
Gap 
(2) 
Gap w/o  
Education Gap 
(3) 
Gap w/o  
Marriage Gap 
(4) 
Gap w/o 
Motherhood Gap 
(5) 
Residual (% of 
Actual Gap) 
Argentina 2001  29.17  -   19.61  25.95  56% 
Armenia 2001  9.88  -    6.94  -    70% 
Belarus 1999  0.28  -    -    -      
Bolivia 2001  34.12  33.61  20.51  -    59% 
Brazil 2000  29.96  -    19.04  -    64% 
Cambodia 1998  14.23  14.93  5.54  -    44% 
Canada 2001  10.85  -    9.62  -    89% 
Chile 2002  45.48  45.04  26.36  38.33  41% 
China 1990  9.27  8.81   -   -    95% 
Colombia 2005  30.81  -    25.15  -    82% 
Costa Rica 
2000 
53.38  -    31.34  52.37  57% 
Ecuador 2001  51.25  50.26  34.79  -    66% 
Ghana 2000  5.74  5.58  -    -    97% 
Greece 2001  34.5  33.8  23.55  34.28  66% 
Guinea 1996  21.37  18.7  16.43  -    64% 
Hungary 2001  7.55  7.09  7.17  3.99  42% 
India 1999  52.89  -  34.57  -    65% 
Iraq 1997  73.21  62.91  65.62  67.55  68% 
Israel 1995  16.94  16.8  12.96   -   76% 
Jordan 2004  64.87  62.54  41.22  -    60% 
Kenya 1999  13.38  11.07  7.31  -    37% 
Kyrgyz Rep 
1999 
8.39  -    3.34  -    40% 
Malaysia 2000  52.91  51.45  19.8  -    35% 
Mongolia 2000  7.89  -     -    -     
Palestine 1997  84.15  79.11  70.86  74.53  67% 
Panama 2000  40.96  -    24.04  39.85  56% 
Portugal 2001  15.63  -    12.13     78% 
Romania 2002  18.02  16.22  17.04  16.17  74% 
Rwanda 2002   -   -    -    -      
Slovenia 2002  3.44  3.26  -    -    95% 
Spain 2001  29.38  -    16.73  -    57% 
Uganda 2002  20.02  17.25  13.75  -    55% 
US 2005  15.74  -    9.48  -    60% 
Venezuela 
2001 
38.66  -    21.98  37.75  55% 
Vietnam 1999  13.58  13.82  7.47  -    57% 
Notes: (1) is the labor force participation gap calculated as the share of men in the labor force minus 
women in the labor force for individuals age 35-44.  For (2)-(4), a counterfactual gap is calculated based 
on a regression of women’s labor force participation as a function of years of education, age, dummy for 
married and dummies for children (0-6+).  Then, we predict women’s labor force participation if they had 
men’s level of education all other variables equal in (2); if they if they did not have “marriage gap” all 37 
 
other variables equal (omitted coefficient on marriage) in (3); if they did not have a “Motherhood gap” all 
other variables equal (omitted coefficients for children 3+) in (4).  (5) is the share of the actual gap left 
after subtracting (2)-(4) from the actual gap.  If a cell is blank, the relevant gap has reversed or is 0, or 
increases the LFP gap, which is noted in the text.  In some cases a cell is blank because variables are 
missing, i.e. the number of children ever born: not available for Canada, India, Jordan, Mongolia, 
Portugal, Spain, Uganda, United States; Labor force participation: not available for Mexico. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1. Analytic Samples  
Country 
Sample 1  Sample 2 
Waves of the Census  Waves of the Census 
     
Argentina   2001  1991, 2001 
Armenia   2001   
Austria   2001  1991, 2001 
Belarus   1999   
Bolivia   2001  1992, 2001 
Brazil   2000  1991, 2000 
Cambodia  1998   
Canada   2001  1991, 2001 
Chile   2002  1992, 2002 
China   1990  1982, 1990 
Colombia   2005  1993, 2005 
Costa Rica   2000  1984, 2000 
Ecuador   2001  1990, 2001 
France   1999  1990, 1999 
Ghana  2000   
Greece   2001  1991, 2001 
Guinea   1996   
Hungary   2001  1990, 2001 
India   1999  1987, 1999 
Iraq   1997   
Israel   1995  1972, 1995 
Jordan   2004   
Kenya   1999  1989, 1999 
Kyrgyz Rep  1999   
Malaysia   2000  1991, 2000 
Mexico   2005  1995, 2005 
Mongolia   2000   
Palestine   1997   
Panama   2000  1990, 2000 
Philippines   2000   
Portugal   2001  1991, 2001 
Romania   2002  1992, 2002 
Rwanda   2002  1991, 2002 
Slovenia   2002   
South Africa   2007  2001, 2007 
Spain   2001  1991, 2001 
Uganda  2002  1991, 2002 
United Kingdom  2001  1991, 2001 
United States   2005  2000, 2005 
Venezuela   2001  1990, 2001 
Vietnam  1999  1989, 1999 
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Table A2. Women’s LFP Regressions  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
Women’s 
LFP 
Women’s 
LFP 
Women’s 
LFP 
Women’s 
LFP 
Log GDP 
-1.506***  -1.070**  -1.096**  -1.127* 
 
(0.444)  (0.500)  (0.526)  (0.559) 
Log GDP-
Squared 
0.0868***  0.0647**  0.0661**  0.0680** 
   (0.0258)  (0.0282)  (0.0296)  (0.0316) 
Share Urban     -0.368*  -0.241  -0.247 
      (0.213)  (0.712)  (0.723) 
Share Urban-
Squared        -0.112  -0.106 
         (0.600)  (0.610) 
Rigidity of 
Employment 
Index           0.000353 
            (0.00187) 
Constant  7.086***  5.216**  5.301**  5.416** 
   (1.884)  (2.130)  (2.208)  (2.324) 
Observations  38  38  38  38 
R-squared  0.251  0.311  0.312  0.313 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Regressions are based on the gender 
gap measures described in the data section. GDP per capita and level of urbanization come from the 
World Development Indicators.  The Rigidity of Employment Index (0=less rigid, 100=more rigid) comes 
from the World Bank’s Doing Business dataset. 
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Notes 
                                                           
1 Art. 26: "Everyone has the right to education. […] and higher education shall be equally accessible to all 
on the basis of merit.... Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and 
to the strengthening of respect for human rights.... "  
2  At the macro-level, cross-country evidence  linking education to growth has not reached definitive 
conclusions (Pritchett 2001, 2006). Among the factors that may explain the discrepancy between macro 
and micro analyses are measurement error in macro regressions and issues related to the quality of 
education.   
3 We acknowledge the possible multidimensionality of gender inequalities. Sundaram and Vanneman 
(2008) found that in Indian districts where there is a higher share of women in the ,girls literacy is further 
behind boys’ literacy and explain this fact by suggesting that in this context where more mothers work 
outside the household more girls have to work to help the family. Moreover, it would be important to 
examine women’s participation by sector with a focus on the employment-status categories. Due to data 
limitations it has not been possible here (in this regard, an interesting analysis has been carried out for 
India by Huisman and Smits, 2009). 
4 We acknowledge the existence of a U-shaped curve for married women’s participation as documented 
by Goldin (1994). That is, when women are poorly educated they are employed in low-skill, often manual 
activities with which a social stigma exists, but when they are educated, however, they find employment 
in more socially acceptable labor market activities.  
5 In some parts of the analysis we define the labor force participation gap as the ratio of the shares, as 
noted. 
6 See Table A1 in the appendix for a description of the analytic sample (1). 
7 Over the period considered, which is the difference between the two census waves.  See Table A, which 
shows the sample for each country. 
8 This observation is supported by regression analysis using the specification in Appendix Table A2. 
9 Table A2 provides evidence that the relationship between female labor force participation and GDP per 
capita is weaker after controlling for urbanization.   
10 Including urban-squared in the regression does not change the results. 
11 The mean of the Rigidity Employment Index is 37.9 and the standard deviation is 16.9.  An increase in 
the Rigidity Employment Index of one standard deviation would lead to a reduction in the gap by 0.027 
percent, so the effect is relatively small. 
12 This might result from a situation where at low levels of urbanization, increases in urbanization lead to 
lower labor force participation among women, so the gap is reduced only when incomes are sufficiently 
high enough to overcome transportation costs.   
13 Therefore our definition of “marriage” also includes cohabitation. 